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Introduction to First Contract Campaign Research 
Winning certification elections is just the first hurdle unions must overcome in 
their efforts to unionize unorganized workers. The union organizing process only 
becomes complete when the union is able to successfully negotiate a first agreement 
for the newly organized unit. All too often stunning union election victories turn into 
devastating first contract defeats through decertifications, broken strikes, plant 
shutdowns or the outright refusal of the employer to bargain. Yet, unions and 
industrial relations researchers still tend to measure union organizing success in terms 
of the number of elections won, or the number of eligible voters in units where the 
union won the election. A more accurate measure would be the number of workers 
covered in units where the union successfully bargained for and executed a first 
agreement. For without a first contract, a union election victory becomes all but 
meaningless, and workers are left without any lasting union representation or 
protection. 
Unfortunately, this number is hard to come by. Although the NLRB keeps 
records of every certification election, there is no centralized reporting system for first 
contract campaign outcomes. In fact, the only way to gain any information on first 
contract campaigns is to use the NLRB election data to track down unions and/or 
employers to survey them about the first contract campaign process. Needless to say, 
this is a very difficult, costly and time consuming endeavor. As a part of their 
organizing surveys, the AFL-CIO has regularly asked organizers whether a first 
contract was achieved, but they have not gone on to ask any further questions about 
the first contract process. On the academic side there have been only two published 
1 
studies of first contract campaigns, in contrast to the profusion of research examining 
union certification election campaigns. Although these studies mark an important first 
step in learning more about what it takes to win a first contract, they provide us with 
only limited insights. For example, neither of the studies examine the role played by 
bargaining unit demographics or union tactics during the first contract campaign. 
It is for this reason that in 1988 the AFL-CIO and I agreed to work together to 
build on the results of our survey of 1986-87 organizing campaigns to research factors 
contributing to first contract outcomes. I was able to survey 100 chief negotiators for 
units in the original sample where the union won the election. The first contract 
interviews included questions regarding bargaining climate, the negotiations process, 
employer and union tactics during the contract campaign, as well as the actual 
bargaining outcome. In addition I requested copies of the first contract for all 
bargaining units where a contract was achieved. 
In this report follows I will discuss the preliminary results from the negotiating 
survey, including Current Bargaining Unit Status, Bargaining Climate, Company 
Background, Unit Background, Negotiator Background, Bargaining Process, Employer 
Tactics Before and After the Election, Union Tactics Before and After the Election and 
Contract Language Achieved in the First Agreement. I have also run more 
sophisticated statistical tests to determine which variables have a statistically significant 
impact on first contract outcome when we control for the influence of all of the other 
variables in the first contract campaign model. This kind of statistical testing is very 
important to better understand the first contract process, because there may be other 
factors that can distort or exaggerate the impact of any specific variable. The results 
from the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 1 at the end of this report, which 
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shows the degree of the impact each variable in the model has on first contract 
outcome. 
Although many of the employer tactics, company background and negotiator 
background variables do appear to be significantly related to first contract outcome, 
the first contract results are much less definitive than the organizing results. There are 
several reasons for this difference. First of all the first contract sample is much smaller 
than the organizing sample (100 compared to 261 cases) because the survey had to 
be limited to the 119 elections in the organizing sample that were won by the union. 
Secondly the bargaining process is much more complicated than the organizing 
process. During the first contract campaign the interaction between public attitudes, 
company background, economic climate, unit demographics, and employer and union 
tactics is much more complex and much more difficult to measure. Larger samples 
and further research will need to be done to get a clearer picture of the first contract 
campaign process. Thus rather than reaching any definitive conclusions, I would 
argue that this first contract study represents exploratory research that lays the ground 
work for follow-up research by other union researchers. 
Current Bargaining Unit Status 
1. First Contract Rates 
Unions were able to obtain a first agreement in 80 out of the 100 units in 
the first contract sample. This 80% first contract rate is relatively good news 
for the labor movement, because the prevailing understanding had been that 
union first contract rates were declining from 77% in the late 1970's to close to 
60% by the end of the decade. However, the improvement in first contract rates 
may be explained by the fact that this is the first study to examine first contract 
rates more than two years after the certification election. With 14% of the units 
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in the survey not even beginning negotiations for their first agreement until more 
than a year had passed since the election, it is no wonder that earlier studies 
which surveyed unions only a year to a year-and-a-half after the election would 
underestimate the first contract rate. Although the success rate declines from 
95% in units where bargaining started within 30 days of the election, to 71% in 
units where bargaining started more than a year titer the election, the overall 
union first contract rate turned out to be better than expected. However, it still 
means that only 27 percent of workers who vote in union certification 
elections end up being covered under a union agreement. 
2. Status of Units Which Failed to Achieve a First Agreement 
Of the twenty units that failed to win a first contract, two units were still 
bargaining, six units were lost through decertification elections, four units were 
lost due to plant closings, in four units the employer successfully withdrew 
recognition because of high turnover and loss of union support and in another 
four units the union withdrew after unsuccessfully attempting to bargain for a 
first agreement. In some cases the plant closing occurred right after the 
election, affording the union little opportunity to bargain over anything other than 
severance pay. For other units the plant closing occurred after the union had 
engaged in an aggressive and apparently successful first contract campaign, 
reaching a tentative agreement only to be notified on the day of the ratification 
vote that the plant was going to be closed before the contract would go into 
effect. 
3. Second Agreements 
The second agreement casualty rate is also disturbing, with five units losing 
certifications by the time the survey was completed, and many more units 
possibly losing their certifications in the process of negotiating for a second 
agreement in 1991 and 1992. For the five units lost after first contracts were 
achieved, two were lost due to decertifications, one from plant closings, and two 
from union withdrawal after failure to reach a second agreement. 
Bargaining Climate 
1. Region 
Unlike the organizing campaigns where unions fared relatively poorly in urban 
areas such as the Northeast, unions won first contracts in 87% of the units 
in the Northeast, compared to 85% for the Midwest, 79% for the 
Westcoast, 71% for the Southeast, 67% for the Rocky Mountain states, 
and 50% for the Southwest. Partly this may be explained by the positive 
relationship between union density and first contract outcome, with the 
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likelihood that tha union is going to achieve a first contract increasing as the 
percent of the work force that is unionized in the local area increases. 
2. Right-to-work states 
The first contract rate in right-to-work states is no different than the overall first 
contract rate of 80%. In fact when we control for the influence of other 
employer and union background and tactic variables, unions do better in 
right-to-work states than in non right-to-work states. This may be because 
the unions organizing in the deep south have done more thorough targeting 
and run more aggressive and creative contract campaigns. 
3. Government and Public Support for Unions 
Unions have more success in winning first agreements in communities 
with a majority of Democratic or Independent political leadership, and 
where according to the chief negotiator the majority of the population is 
favorably inclined towards unions. Community support and public attitudes 
therefore appear to play a more important role in first contract campaigns than 
organizing campaigns, because the union relies more on community support to 
pressure the employer to bargain in good faith, than it does to convince 
individual workers to vote union. 
4. Other Bargaining Climate Variables 
Local unemployment rates and rural versus urban location do not appear 
to have a significant impact on the unions chances for winning a first 
contract. 
Company Background 
1. Union experience 
Unions have greater success in winning first contracts in firms where 
other units at the same site or at different sites are under contract, with 
unions achieving first contracts in 84% of the campaigns with other organized 
units, compared to a first contract rate of 76% in firms which had no other units 
under union contract. This means that unions should seriously consider 
targeting firms where they or other unions have other bargaining units under 
contract. 
2. Economic Sector 
Union first contract rates are higher in service sector units (84% first 
contract rate) compared to manufacturing units (78%). This is especially 
true for unions who bargain with non-profit service sector employers such as 
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hospitals and social service agencies where the first contract rate averages 
92%. However, when you control for bargaining unit demographics such as 
race gender and average wage, as well as employer and union tactics, unions 
actually appear to do better in manufacturing than in service sector units. 
Unions did equally well in achieving first contracts in service sector health care 
units and in low wage manufacturing units in the south, most likely because 
both types of units had significant number of women and minority low-wage 
workers. Thus, the fact that the service sector remains largely non-union has 
more to do with the lack of union initiative in past decades than it does with any 
inherent difficulty in organizing and bargaining first contracts for service sector 
units. 
3. Company Financial Condition 
In contrast to the organizing results where unions did better in unprofitable 
companies, unions had more success in winning first contracts with 
employers in good financial condition. This most likely is because the 
employers ability to pay for improvements in a first contract is directly related to 
the employers willingness to settle with a union. The important role played by 
company financial status is evidenced by the fact that most of the plant closings 
came in units where the union had won the election by a large margin but the 
company was in poor financial condition long before the election. In fact 
cutbacks in wages and benefits and lack of job security were some of the 
primary organizing issues in these campaigns. Yet the high support for the 
union made no difference if the company was going to shut down or declare 
bankruptcy anyway. Thus research into the companies' financial condition and 
careful targeting based on the employer's ability to pay for a first contract are 
important considerations for unions entering into organizing campaigns. Unions 
faced with limited organizing staff and resources need to consider the likelihood 
of winning the election and the likelihood of achieving a first contract in making 
their targeting decisions. That is not to say that targeting corporations on the 
verge of financial ruin is always a mistake for the workers involved. In two of 
the plant closing cases in this sample, the union was able to play an important 
role in protecting the employee job severance rights and benefits, protection the 
workers never would have received if they had not won the election. 
Unit Background 
1. Unit Size 
Unit size plays a much less significant role in determining first contract 
outcome than it does in determining election outcome. The mean number 
of eligible voters is only slightly larger for units unable to achieve a first 
agreement (109 compared to 108.37 for units where a first agreement was 
reached). Although the percent first contract rate was only 66% for the 15 units 
in the sample with more than 150 eligible voters, it was 80% for the 5 units with 
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more than 250 eligible voters. This may be explained by the fact that although 
every vote counts in a union election, bargaining for a first contract can require 
just as much effort, staff time and resources for 10 employees as it does for 
200. 
2. Unit Demographics 
Unit demographics play a similar role in both first contract and organizing 
campaigns. Union first contract rates were highest in units with more than 
60% women or minority workers (87%). Unions also did slightly better in 
units with a higher percentage of part-timers and workers who previously were 
members of unions and in units where the average wage was less than $5.00 
an hour. 
3. Unit Type 
Unions did best in service and maintenance and white collar units, with an 
88% first contract rate in service and maintenance units and a 100% first 
contract rate for the four white collar units in the sample. The first contract 
rate for blue collar units was 73%. The fact that unions were able to achieve 
contracts in all of the white collar units, may tell us that although clerical, 
technical and professional employees appear to be more difficult to convince to 
vote for the union, once they vote for the union they may have more 
commitment towards staying unionized than their blue collar counterparts. On 
the other hand white collar employers may simply be better off financially than 
blue collar employers, and thus more willing or able to afford to settle on a first 
agreement. Unfortunately the number of white collar elections is so small that it 
makes it difficult to come to any definitive conclusions regarding the relationship 
between white collar status and first contract outcome. 
Negotiator Background 
1. Contrast with lead organizers 
One of the most interesting, yet not surprising findings in the first contract 
research is the difference between chief negotiator and lead organizer 
background. Chief negotiators are slightly older, better educated and more 
likely to come from middle class backgrounds than lead organizers. They are 
also less likely to be female and minority, more likely to work for the 
international, and tend to have slightly less rank-and-file experience than lead 
organizers. The average age for chief negotiators was 46 compared to 45 for 
lead organizers, though the mean negotiator age for units where first contracts 
were achieved was the same as the mean organizer age for units where the 
union won the election (42). 
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2. Rank-and-file experience 
As with lead organizers, rank-and-file experience in itself does not appear to 
play a significant role in determining first contract outcome. That is to say that 
negotiators with one to twenty-five years of rank and file experience do just as 
well as those with no rank-and-file experience, but that as the years of rank-
and-file experience increase beyond twenty-five years the first contract rate 
dramatically declines to only 50%. 
3. Negotiator Class Background and College Education 
Negotiators with college educations and those who come from a middle 
class background do appear to have greater bargaining success than 
those negotiators who do not have a college education or do not come 
from a middle class background. This is in direct contrast to the results for 
lead organizers where middle class and/or college educated organizers did 
worse than those from more working class backgrounds, with no college 
education. 31% of the chief negotiators had a college education, compared to 
26% of the lead organizers. 20% of the chief negotiators came from a middle or 
upper class background, compared to 17% of the lead organizers. The first 
contract rate for chief negotiators with a college education was 84% compared 
to 78% for those who did not complete a four year degree program. The first 
contract rate for negotiators form a middle or upper class background was 95% 
compared to 76% for those from a working class background. These results 
may tell us that the complexity of contract negotiations is greatly aided by the 
speaking, writing and research skills that a college education provides, as well 
as the self-confidence brought on by coming from a more advantaged 
background. However, it is equally possible that the results simply tell us that 
the unions who provide the best negotiator training and utilize the most effective 
fist contract campaign strategies are also the unions most likely to recruit 
college educated staff from upper or middle class backgrounds. 
4. Negotiator race and gender 
Only 5% of the negotiators were minority and only 9% were female compared to 
15% minority and 12% female for lead organizers. As with organizers, minority 
and female chief negotiators have better first contract win rates than their 
white male counterparts, but the numbers are so small that it is difficult to 
come to any reliable conclusions regarding the relationship between negotiator 
race and gender and first contract outcome. What we know is that there is a 
great deal of room for improvement in union efforts to recruit and promote more 
women and minorities, both as organizers and negotiators. 
5. Negotiator Training and Experience 
International representatives had slightly more success in bargaining for 
first agreements than their local or regional counterparts. This may 
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represent the increased training and experience of international representatives 
and the commitment of international resources to the campaign. Chief 
negotiators who were the lead organizer for the campaign, or who had any 
organizing experience also did better than those who were not the lead 
organizer, or who had never worked as an organizer. Servicing and bargaining 
experience, including the total number of contracts negotiated and the total 
number of first contracts negotiated, also appeared to have a slight positive 
impact on probability of winning a first contract, while officer experience had a 
slight negative impact. However, the impact of the negotiator experience 
variables failed to hold up once you control for the influence of union and 
employer background and tactics. 
Bargaining Process 
1. Delay 
Bargaining for first contracts is a time consuming process fraught with delays. 
For the total sample the average number of bargaining sessions was 14.79 
compared to 15.83 for units where a first contract was achieved. Most units 
averaged five months between the election and the beginning of negotiations 
and many more months of bargaining after that. First contract rates declined 
as the delay between the election and the first bargaining session 
increased, with unions doing significantly better in units with less than 
two months between the election and the start of bargaining. Bargaining 
went somewhat faster and was more successful in units where negotiations 
were coordinated with other units or work places, however not to a statistically 
significant degree. 
2. Release time for Committee Members 
As would be expected, ground rules played an especially important role in the 
first contract process. Although bargaining took place during work hours for 
37% of the units, companies only agreed to pay release time for negotiating 
committee members in 20% of the units, which covered only 7 of the 37 units 
where bargaining took place during work hours. Unions won first contracts in 
all of the units where the employer provided paid release time. That does 
not necessarily mean that paid release time guarantees contract victory. More 
likely, paid release time is a reflection of employer willingness and ability to 
reach an acceptable agreement with the union. Or, in some cases, paid release 
time may be a proxy for union strength, where the intensity of the membership 
solidarity and community support pressures the employer into bargaining on the 
union's terms. 
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3. Location of Bargaining 
The location of bargaining varied greatly, but did not appear to have any 
impact on first contract outcome. 16% of the units bargained at the 
workplace, 58% bargained at a neutral site such as a hotel, 4% bargained at 
the union hall and 5% alternated bargaining between the workplace and the 
union hall. 
4. Gagrules 
Ground rules regarding reporting about negotiations to the media and the 
general public during negotiations have somewhat confusing results. 32% 
of the units agreed to a gagrule preventing any discussions with the public or 
media until negotiations were over. 20% agreed to bargain in the sunshine with 
no restrictions on speaking with the public or the media, and 45% of the units 
never addressed the issue of gagrules during negotiations. Units with a gagrule 
averaged a 94% first contract rate compared to a 70% rate for units with a 
sunshine rule, and 76% for units with no rule whatsoever. The results for open 
bargaining may be somewhat misleading because negotiating a "sunshine" 
ground rule in no way guarantees that the union will actually use the media, nor 
is it a guarantee that the union will do a good job of using the media. In fact, in 
those cases where the union bargained for a "sunshine" rule and actually used 
the media during the campaign, the first contract rate was 80%. Unions also 
may only bargain for sunshine rules when they expect intense employer 
opposition, while they may be more willing to agree to gagrules when they do 
not expect to need public support for their campaign. 
5. Side-bars 
The use of one-on-one side-bars between the chief negotiators for each side 
also had mixed results for first contract outcome. Side-bars were used in 44% 
of the units surveyed, and were associated with a first contract rate of 89%. 
However side-bars were most effective (92% first contract rate) in units 
where the bargaining committee was notified of the side-bar in advance 
by the chief negotiator and when the contents of all side-bar discussions 
were reported back to committee members. In contrast, unions only had a 
67% first contract rate in those units where the contents of side-bar negotiations 
were not reported back to the members. This is an extremely important variable 
because it measures not only the willingness of the parties to reach agreement. 
It also measures the relationship between the chief negotiator and the 
committee in terms of trust, accountability and involvement. When negotiators 
notify the committee in advance of side-bars and report back on the sidebar 
contents after meeting with management, it keeps the committee involved in the 
process, and helps them maintain a sense of participation and ownership of the 
negotiations and the contract. It also puts the employer on notice that the 
workers are involved and committed to reaching a decent agreement. This 
contrasts sharply with secret sidebar negotiations between chief negotiators 
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were willing to bargain in good faith, and another 21% bargained hard but 
still were willing to give on some important union issues. Interestingly 
enough, 25% of the units where the employer had campaigned hard during 
organizing, were able to achieve good agreements without significant employer 
opposition. This alone could explain why employer tactic variables for the 
organizing campaign would not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with 
first contract outcomes. There were just enough employers who switched from 
strongly anti-union behavior to good faith bargaining weaken the overall effect of 
these tactics. 
3. Employer tactics during the first contract campaign 
Despite the number of employers who seemed to tone down their anti-union 
efforts between the organizing and first contract campaigns, a significant 
number of employers did engage in very hard bargaining. 61% of the 
employers used an outside consultant or lawyer on retainer on their 
negotiating team. 30% of the employers fired workers for union activity 
during the contract campaign. More than 20% of the employers made 
some kind of unilateral change in the terms and conditions of 
employment after the election and 25% of the employers made threats of 
lay-offs and plant closings during the contract campaign. Captive 
audience meetings and supervisor one-on-ones also continued after the 
election in more than 20% of the bargaining units. More than a third of 
the employers also engaged in hard bargaining at the table with tactics 
such as playing one sector of the unit against the other, delay and stalling 
tactics and surface bargaining. Not only did a significant number of 
employers in the sample engage in aggressive anti-union tactics during 
negotiations for the first contract, but all of these employer tactics were 
associated with lower first contract rates than the units where these 
tactics were not used. 
Union Tactics Before the Election 
1. Targeting 
Unions were much more likely to win first contracts in units where the 
original decision to launch the organizing drive was based on factors 
other than or in addition to worker interest. This included targeting 
bargaining units because the union already represents similar units in the same 
company or industry and/or based on the employers financial stability. In fact 
unions won first contracts in 90% of the units where targeting was used, 
compared to a 75% first contract rate in units which were not targeted. It is 
worth cautioning however that when it comes to first contract negotiations, a 
poor job of researching the employer may be worse than no job at all, because 
any union that goes into negotiations with a false sense of the employer's 
power and vulnerability is going to have a very hard time bargaining for a first 
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contract. The results therefore seem to show that unions should target 
organizing leads on the basis of the employers ability to pay for a first 
agreement and the employer vulnerability to union pressure tactics. However, 
they must also be careful that if they are going to do targeting, that they do it 
well. 
2. Other union tactics during the organizing campaign 
As with management tactics, union organizing tactics such as representative 
organizing committees, percent of the unit housecalled, use of solidarity days, 
and union issues do not appear to have a significant impact on first contract 
outcome. Once again this may be because there is a great deal of variance 
between union campaign strategies during the organizing and first contract 
campaign. The broad range of employer tactics used after the election do 
appear to have had an impact on which tactics unions used in their contract 
campaigns. Several union negotiators told me they did not have to organize a 
contract campaign because the employer was willing to sit down and bargain a 
fairly good first contract without much of a fight. Thus, unlike organizing 
campaigns, where few unions were able to win elections without a rank-and-file 
intensive campaign, there were many units where the union was able to win a 
first contract with only a few bargaining sessions and very little membership 
involvement. However, it does appear that in those units where employer 
opposition continued after the election, union tactics such as representative 
committees, regular newsletters and membership meetings, solidarity days, 
corporate pressure tactics and a focus on broader community issues do appear 
to play an important role in helping the union win a first agreement. 
Union Tactics during the First Contract Campaign 
1. Overview of Union Tactics During the First Contract Campaign 
The variance in union tactics for first contract campaigns is once again very 
revealing. Many of the unions with the worst first contract records persisted in 
having very small, unrepresentative committees, with little or no membership 
contact or organizing during the contract campaign. In contrast the unions with 
the highest first contract rates were much more likely to run very creative and 
aggressive rank-and-file intensive contract campaigns. Unfortunately there were 
only a small number of unions among those surveyed which fit the latter 
description. Unions had representative bargaining committees in just 26% of the 
campaigns, and rank-and-file negotiating committees played an active role in 
discussions at the table in only 45% of the units in the sample. Unions 
continued housecalls to members in only 18% of the contract campaigns and 
continued small group meetings in only 17% units. Newsletters and solidarity 
days were used in 30% of the units, while corporate pressure tactics, media 
campaigns, job actions, legislative initiatives, agency investigations and 
leafletting all were used in less than 16% of the units surveyed. 
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2. Impact of Union Tactics on First Contract Outcome 
Because of the great variance in tactics used, and because so few of the unions 
in the sample used a more aggressive and creative union strategy during the 
first contract campaign, the results for the union tactic variables are much less 
definitive than they were for the election data. In fact many union membership 
mobilization and bargaining tactics do not appear to have a significant positive 
or negative impact on first contract outcome when they are examined 
individually. However when they are combined into one rank-and-file intensive 
campaign variable, the use of these tactics do appear to significantly improve 
the unions chancos of winning a first agreement. That is to say union first 
contract rates significantly improve the more of the following rank-and-
file intensive campaign tactics that they use. 
a)Continued one-on-one organizing throughout the first contract 
campaign including housecalls and small group meetings. 
b)Active and representative bargaining committees. The 
negotiating committee should represent at least 5% of the unit and 
be representative of bargaining unit demographics such as gender 
and race. Rank-and-file members on the bargaining committee 
should play an active role at the table and in caucuses. 
c)Full involvement of the membership in developing contract 
proposals through one-on-one contract surveys and allowing 
members to make revisions and/or vote on initial contract 
proposals before they are presented to the employer. 
d)Aggressive efforts to keep the members informed and involved in 
the bargaining process including regular newsletters and 
membership meetings to report back to the membership on the 
negotiations process. 
e) Inside membership mobilization tactics including solidarity days, 
mass grievances and work-to-rule actions. 
f) Outside pressure tactics such as boycotts, stockholder actions 
and the informational leafletting and/or picketing of the workplace 
or company headquarters. 
g) Developing community support by focusing on broader issues 
that go beyond wages, hours and working conditions and using 
editorial visits to educate the media about union issues. 
These results seem to show that utilizing some of these tactics but not others 
serves to backfire on the union. When unions use a majority of the tactics 
listed above, the first contract rate averages 88%. In contrast when the 
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union utilize only one or two of these tactics the first contract rate 
averages as low as 50%. Thus if the union has an active representative 
committee that never reports back to the unit, bargaining unit members may be 
much less likely to trust and fight for the union. It is the cumulative effective of 
these tactics that keeps the membership mobilized and committed, builds public 
support and puts the employer on notice that the workers are committed to 
winning a good agreement and staying unionized. The results also show that 
what happens at the bargaining table may be the least important part of 
the bargaining process. The union tactics contributing most to first 
contract success are those which involve rank-and-file leadership 
mobilizing the membership to keep pressure on the employer in the 
workplace and in the larger community. 
3. Union ratification process 
Two other union tactic variables are worth pointing out. Much has been written 
about the lack of democracy in American unions, but that lack of democracy is 
usually measured by clauses in the union constitution rather than how they 
actually behave. It is therefore worth pointing out that in 84% of the units in 
the sample where a first contract was settled, members were given a 
written summary of the contract settlement before the ratification vote. 
This contrasts sharply with the widely held perception that most ratification votes 
are held without the members receiving any material in writing summarizing the 
settlement, depriving them of the opportunity to make a fully informed decision 
on how whether the settlement is worth supporting. Perhaps even more 
significant, in 64% of the units where a first contract settlement was reached, 
ratification elections were held by secret ballot, despite the fact that very few 
international union constitutions require secret ballot ratification for collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Contract Language in the Final Agreement 
Perhaps the most exciting result of this first contract study, is the data it 
provided us on the nature and content of first agreements. Not only did 80% of 
the units in the first contract sample win a first contract, but the contracts they 
achieved were much better than might be expected. 44 out of the 75 units in 
non-right-to-work states attained union shops, and 11 attained agency shops. 
That means that only 4% of the units in non-right-to-work states ended up with 
open shops, despite the fact that many employers bargained extremely hard 
over the issue of union security. All of the contracts with part-timers included 
under the recognition clause, provided some kind of pro-rated benefits for part-
timers and 77% provided pro-rated seniority. 75% of the units had either a flat-
rate or a percentage wage increase, with 15% eliminating a merit pay system, 
and 34% establishing a step pay system. 83.4% of the contracts included health 
and safety language, 90% included anti-discrimination language, 97% included 
grievance and arbitration language. Although the majority of the agreements 
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simply put existing benefit language in the contract, 55% of the contracts 
included improvements in health insurance. 
On the more negative side, 5% of the units ended up with wage and health 
insurance concessions, while only 14% of the contracts included parental leave, 
and only 12% included sick leave for taking care of dependents. 97% of the 
agreements included a management rights clause, 92% included a no strike 
clause and 45% included a zipper clause. However, when you take into 
consideration the nationwide trend toward wage and benefits concessions in 
long term union agreements, the fact that only a small percentage of the first 
contracts included concessions is very good news for American unions. When 
we also consider the number of these contracts that were bargained despite 
vehement employer opposition, these first agreements must be seen as quite an 
accomplishment for the labor movement and the workers they organized. 
Conclusion 
As was pointed out in the introduction, this research is only the first step in 
gaining a better understanding of the first contract process. Yet, despite the small 
sample, and despite the limited nature of the statistical results, this study does provide 
us with important insights into how unions are faring in first contract campaigns. We 
know that despite intense employer opposition, close to 80% of unions are able to 
achieve a first contract after winning an NLRB certification election. We also know that 
the contracts they are winning are better than might be expected. As every union 
worker knows, first contracts are only the second crucial step in the ongoing process 
of unionization. The contracts rarely live up to worker expectations and in some cases 
provide not much more than a grievance procedure and putting into writing existing 
conditions and benefits. Yet even the weakest of these agreements still represent a 
significant improvement over working in a non-union setting, because these rights and 
benefits, however limited, are now secure for the life of the agreement. 
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One thing the results clearly tell us, is that the collective bargaining process for 
first agreements is very complex. Bargaining climate variables, unit demographics and 
employer and union tactics all have an interactive impact on whether the union is able 
to achieve a first agreement. The complexity of this interaction makes the first contract 
process much less suited to statistical analysis than the organizing process. After all, 
union elections are clear cut, the union either wins or loses. But first contracts can 
easily range from major union victories to concessionary agreements that severely 
restrict union activity, and leave the membership not much better off than they were 
before the union came in. A true measure of union success would be a comparison of 
the first agreements with the terms and conditions of employment before the union 
drive was initiated. Unfortunately that data is extremely difficult to come by. 
But despite the complexity we have learned quite a bit about the first contract 
process. We have learned that employers have a great number of legal and illegal 
tactics at their disposal to thwart union efforts to bargain a first agreement; and a 
significant percentage of employers are using these tactics very effectively. But we 
have also learned that there are union tactics which can effectively diffuse the 
employer campaign if they are used correctly. Continuing the organizing after the 
election through housecalls, one-on-one contact, solidarity days and small group 
meetings, keeping the members informed through newsletters and regular membership 
meetings, and pressuring the employer from the outside through community-labor 
coalitions, corporate pressure tactics and media campaigns all can help the union 
achieve a first agreement. More than that, the benefits of utilizing these tactics go far 
beyond the first contract. The contrast between a very open, membership intensive 
organizing campaign and a very closed, staff dominated contract campaign, may play 
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a role in membership apathy and disillusionment. The negative effects of this contrast, 
still have effect long after the first contract has been reached because they make it 
more difficult for the union to develop stewards, enforce the agreement or build for the 
second contract campaigns. 
There is still a great deal more work that needs to be done before we really 
understand what makes or breaks a union first contract campaign. My hope is that this 
research has laid the groundwork for future union and academic efforts to learn more 
about the first contract process. It is also research that can be easily built upon with 
follow up studies comparing future agreements with the first contract, and the success 
of future contract campaigns. In the end I hope that it will help unions and researchers 
have a much better understanding of the critical role played by union tactics in both 
organizing and first contract campaigns. But more importantly, I hope that this study 
will help lead organizers and chief negotiators across the country to build on their 
successes and learn from their failures. 
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Table 1:lmpact of Negotiating Survey Variables on Rrst Contract Outcome 
Variables showing moderate to strong positive Impact on first contract outcome 
1. Other units of the employer unionized 
2. Percent union density in the area 
3. Unit 60% or more minority and or female 
4. Unit in manufacturing sector 
5. Union negotiator had 1-25 years rank-and-file experience 
6. Unit targeted for other reasons besides worker interest 
7. Union used combination of rank-and-file intensive strategies 
(this is an additive variable including the following: 
%Housecalled during negotiations 
Focus on community issues 
Inside strategies used 
Sidebars reported to committee 
Report on negotiations to membership meetings 
Committee active at table 
Committee active in caucuses 
Newsletter distributed 
Solidarity days used 
Editorial visits used 
Members vote/revise proposals 
Contract survey done 1on1 
%Unit on negotiating committee 
Leafletting used 
Corporate pressure tactics used 
Variables showing slight positive impact on first contract outcome 
1. Unit located in right to work state 
2. Chief negotiator female or minority 
3. Negotiator from middle-class background 
4. Mediator brought into negotiations 
Variables showing moderate negative impact on first contract outcome 
1. Employer ran public campaign 
2. Employer used outside lawyer or consultant as chief negotiator 
3. Initial employer proposals concessionary 
Variables showing slight negative impact on first contract outcome 
1. More than 60 days delay between election and start of bargaining 
2. Employer continued captive audience meetings after the election 
3. Employer made unilateral changes after election 
4. Employer engaged in surface bargaining 
Variables showing no ctatisticaliy significant impact on first contract outcome 
1. Unit size 
2. Percent unemployment in the area 
3. Average wage in unit $5.00 or less an hour 
4. Company in profitable condition 
5. Employer fired workers for union activity after the election 
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